7 - Lithuania and the East European Left, by Boris Kagarlitsky>
Lithuania and the 

East European left

by Boris Kagarlitsky


The Lithuanians have elected former communists! The results of 
the elections in Lithuania still had not been finalized when this 
sensational news flashed across the pages of the newspapers. 
For the inhabitants of the former Soviet Union, the reports 
shouldnÕt have been so stunning. WerenÕt former communists in 
power in Russia, the Ukraine, Moldavia and the republics of 
Central Asia? WerenÕt former party functionaries running the new 
democratic Rumania? And hadnÕt Gorbunov, a leader of Òtotally 
democraticÓ Latvia and a convinced Latvian nationalist, once 
been among the leaders of the local Communist Party?

Nevertheless, something important has indeed happened in 
Lithuania.

For the first time, a left party has triumphed in free elections in 
Eastern Europe. For the first time, an opposition has won power 
from a government in democratic fashion. For the first time, an 
organization which is the direct and official successor to a 
Communist Party has emerged as a countryÕs dominant political 
force through a free expression of popular will. And most 
importantly, nationalism in Eastern Europe has suffered its first 
defeat. 

The Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania (DLPL) has never been 
distinguished by particular radicalism. In 1989, when the question 
of independence came onto the agenda, the Communist Party in 
Lithuania, as in the other Baltic countries, underwent a split 
between supporters of independence and opponents. The 
orthodox minority suffered a defeat, and after the events of August 
1991, was forced into clandestinity. The majority, headed by the 
popular and pragmatic Brazauskas, declared itself a social-
democratic party and changed its name.

The party program was phrased very cautiously. The leaders of 
the DLPL did everything possible to prove that they were not 
communists or ÒredsÕÕ. Brazauskas and his supporters might better 
have been called social liberals than social democrats. They 
accepted the need for privatization and for restructuring the 
ownership of industry on a share-holding basis. They insisted that 
without the development of private property it was impossible to 
create a market, and constantly declared their adherence to the 
idea of the national revival of Lithuania. Alongside the DLPL 
stood a social-democratic party proclaiming even more right-wing 
positions.

The liberal wave sweeping Eastern Europe could not have failed 
to have an effect on the Lithuanian left. But, although Brazauskas 
and his supporters made numerous concessions to liberalism, 
they could not avoid accusations of ÒcommunismÕÕ. A furious 
propaganda campaign was unleashed against the DLPL. Not only 
nationalists and right-wingers attacked it, but also centrists and 
social democrats, who justifiably saw it as a dangerous rival.

Meanwhile, new political winds were blowing in Eastern Europe. 
In elections for the Polish Sejm, the Left Democratic Union, 
founded by Òsocial democratizedÕÕ communists, scored big gains. 
The party missed out on becoming the largest parliamentary group 
by only one percent of the votes. The communists in 
Czechoslovakia did not change their name; in 1968 their party 
had headed the ÒPrague SpringÕÕ; and earlier still, it had been the 
main force in the antifascist resistance. In the 1992 elections the 
left bloc formed around the Communist Party enjoyed 
considerable success. A number of former dissidents with left-
wing views were elected to parliament on the same list with 
communists. The old division between ÒdemocratsÕÕ and 
ÒcommunistsÕÕ has given way to a new demarcation between right 
and left.

The elections in Slovakia were won by a left-centrist coalition 
calling for independence. Many observers were surprised by the 
SlovaksÕ desire to take their leave of Prague, but the people of 
Slovakia feared being turned into an internal colony, the semi-
developed periphery of a capitalist Czechija. In the municipal 
elections in eastern Berlin in the spring of 1992, the most 
successful grouping was the Party of Democratic Socialism 
(PDS), formed on the basis of the former Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany. The PDS is headed by the popular lawyer, Gregor Gysi, 
who in the 1970s achieved fame in the German Democratic 
Republic as a defender of dissidents. The PDS proclaimed itself a 
radical left party; rejecting the ideology of the communists, it did 
not accept the mild reformism of the social democrats either.

Reformed post-communist parties have strengthened their 
positions throughout all Eastern Europe. For voters, the 
ideological packaging in which these parties have served up their 
programs has not been especially important. The reformed 
communists in Poland did their utmost to social-democratize 
themselves, and won the support of every fifth Pole. The 
Czechoslovak communists, on the other hand, stressed their 
fidelity to the traditions of their party. They also scored successes. 
The PDS in Germany presented itself as a party with a quite new 
and original ideology. It made gains as well.

Millions of people who supported the post-communist parties did 
not do so because they believed in the new ideas. They had 
simply realized that they had been deceived by the politicians 
who had promised that independence and capitalism would bring 
them prosperity and a flowering of democracy. Neither prosperity 
nor a particularly meaningful democracy had resulted. In these 
circumstances people voted for the most left-wing party contesting 
the elections, or for the most familiar and serious of the left parties. 
They were almost always the Òpost-communistsÓ.

In Lithuania as elsewhere, people voted not only in favor of the 
left, but also against a right-wing government. The leaders of 
Sajudis were confident that they enjoyed the support of the 
population simply because they had led the country to 
independence. But in independent Lithuania, people found life 
nowhere near as pleasant as they had hoped. The economic 
crisis deepened; bitter, pointless conflicts broke out between 
Russia and Byelorussia; national minorities suffered oppression, 
and authoritarianism was strengthened

Ultimately, all the republics of the USSR received their 
independence, even those which had not demanded it. None of 
them, however, received the prosperity they had been promised. 
An Òera of name changesÓ began.

Very likely, Lithuania will not be the only country of the former 
communist bloc where a left party wins a majority in parliament. 
The crisis of capitalism in the West, popular disappointment with 
nationalism, the failure of privatization and the chaos of the Òfree 
market economyÕÕ are creating a new situation in Eastern Europe.

A great deal depends on the DLPL. BrazauskasÕs party now has 
to show whether it is capable of forming parliamentary coalitions 
and of arriving at compromises with other political forces, without 
at the same time renouncing its own principles. Above all, the 
party must put forward a real way out of the crisis.

While they were in opposition, the leaders of the DLPL sought to 
prove their moderation and good sense. Now that they are on the 
threshold of power, they are about to discover that moderation 
and half measures are not of much use in a crisis. People voted 
for the DLPL because they wanted change. If this change doesnÕt 
come about, the party will lose its popular support.

But if the party begins a serious fight for change, it will have to 
enter into serious confrontation with the forces that have led not 
only Lithuania, but Russia and all of Eastern Europe into a dead 
end Ð that is, with the forces which are destroying the state sector 
through Ònomenklatura privatizationÕÕ, and which are undermining 
production in the interests of speculative trade. In short, the DLPL 
will have to mount a fight against the bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
and the International Monetary Fund.

The choice will not be easy; radical changes are always hard to 
implement. But the DLPL now has a chance. It is not only the 
people of Lithuania who have spoken out for changes, for a 
regulated economy, and for social justice. The people of Russia, 
as well, have grown tired of the Yeltsin-Gaidar experiment. We too 
have to find a way out of the dead-end.

The lesson of Lithuania is quite straightforward: leftists can win 
elections in Òpost-communistÕÕ societies, and not in ten yearsÕ 
time, but right now. We should not underrate ourselves. In Russia, 
the Party of Labor has a future; democratic leftists have real 
prospects. The main thing is not to let the chance slip through our 
fingers.	o

Boris Kagarlitsky is a member of the Executive Committee of the 
Russian Party of Labor and a Moscow city councillor