Charlemagne

Europe without Aznar

Mar 18th 2004
From The Economist print edition

Spain's new government shifts the balance in the European Union

THE bombs that altered the course of the Spanish elections have also reshaped European politics. The departure of José María Aznar and his People's Party will shift the balance of power within the European Union. Broadly speaking, this is good for France and Germany, and bad for Britain and Poland. It is good for European federalists and bad for Eurosceptics and Atlanticists. In theory, it is good for the left and bad for the right, because conservatives were beaten by Socialists. But nominally left-wing governments in Britain and Poland are mourning, and a right-wing French government is cheering. Left-right divisions are no longer the chief determinant of tribal loyalties in Europe. It is attitudes to the United States and the future of the EU that matter now.

Mr Aznar's most crucial policy choice was to embrace America's war on terrorism and the toppling of Saddam Hussein. He chose this path partly for reasons internal to Spain, notably the long struggle against the Basque terrorist group, ETA. But he also believed that Spain, as a country on the rise, could aspire to be a global power, forging new alliances in the Americas and in Europe. Under the Socialist government of Felipé González, he felt, Spain had too often passively followed a line determined by France and Germany.

Mr Aznar made little secret of his contempt for the ossified economies and leadership pretensions of the big two. He dismissed France's efforts to protect its language and film industry as a “symptom of a culture in decline”. His most recent foreign minister, Ana Palacio, loudly deplored Franco-German efforts to dominate the EU. Such attitudes caused deep offence in Paris and Berlin (Mr Aznar had famously bad relations with both Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder), but secretly delighted Britain's Tony Blair.

The significance of the Aznar-inspired shift in Spanish thinking became most evident in the run-up to the Iraq war. The claim by France and Germany to speak for Europe was decisively undermined in January 2003 by the now-famous “letter of eight”, a pro-American declaration by eight European governments—Britain, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Spain—that was co-ordinated by Mr Aznar's people. As well as being a gesture of support for the Bush administration, it had an undeclared sub-text about the EU. Henceforth France and Germany could no longer presume that, wherever they led, the rest of the EU would naturally follow.

Spain's Socialist Party always denounced this shift away from the big European powers and towards America. They drew strength from the fact that some 90% of Spanish people opposed the Iraq war. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the Socialist leader who will now become prime minister, accused the Aznar government of serving only “the interests of Bush” and of betraying Spain's traditional commitment to “pro-European” policies. He had already sworn to restore previously “magnificent” relations with France and Germany.

Now that Spain has, in essence, switched sides within a divided Europe, this could tip the European Union's fragile power balance. One EU official goes so far as to say that “with the disappearance of Aznar, the alternative pillar to France and Germany crumbles.” It certainly looks a lot weaker. Italy's Silvio Berlusconi, though pro-American, has a reputation for eccentricity and dodgy dealings that make him an alarming ally. He is also vulnerable to Spanish-style assaults from the anti-war left. Poland is a poor country, led by a weak and unstable government. The Dutch, Portuguese and Danes are not big enough to make a counterweight to the French, Germans and Spanish. Nor are the Hungarians or Czechs; some of their top diplomats have anyway long said privately that they had made a mistake in signing the “letter of eight”. The upshot may be to leave Mr Blair isolated.

From A to Z
Europe is now waiting expectantly to see how Mr Zapatero's anti-war, pro-European rhetoric translates into actual policy. Even EU officials close to Mr Zapatero's party believe that he will have to “get himself off the hook” of campaign rhetoric that strayed into isolationism and pacifism. The highest-profile issue is, obviously, his pledge to pull Spanish troops out of Iraq if a new United Nations mandate is not forthcoming by the end of June. It may be that some form of “internationalisation” of the nation-building process in Iraq will allow Mr Zapatero to soften his position. Less remarked upon, so far, has been his party's commitment to cut Spain's already nugatory level of defence spending. This would dismay not just the Americans but also many of Spain's EU (and NATO) partners.

European leaders will get a chance to assess Mr Zapatero at their summit in Brussels next week. This meeting had been expected to concentrate on economic reforms (the so-called “Lisbon” agenda, which Mr Aznar played a key role in devising), but it will now be overshadowed by terrorism and security issues. There have been calls for a European CIA, reflecting the instinct of federalists that, whatever the problem, “more Europe” is always the solution.

More significant may be confirmation that Mr Zapatero's arrival will make it a lot easier to agree the new EU constitution. It was largely Spanish and Polish objections to a new voting system—the “double majority”—that scuppered efforts to strike a deal at December's EU summit. But Mr Zapatero has signalled that he will accept double majority, raising the prospect that the isolated Poles may have to fold. In fact, this concession was one that the Aznar government had already hinted at. But the new Spanish government may influence the constitution in other ways. The Socialists favour pan-European tax harmonisation, for instance; one more reason for Mr Blair and the British to regret the passing of José María Aznar.